Würth: How a Screw Wholesaler Became a Global Group Through Field Sales

Why Würth is instructive for small businesses

The Würth Group is one of the best-known examples of a family business that grew from a small firm into an international group. Its core business is unspectacular: screws, wall plugs, tools, chemicals, and other assembly and fastening materials for trades and industry. That is exactly why the case is instructive. Würth did not conquer its market with a new product, but mainly through the way it sells.

This case study answers one question: How could a screw wholesaler with a large field sales force grow into a global group, and what of it can be transferred to a small business? To answer it, I first organize the publicly documented facts, then present a mental model from sales research that explains the decision for an in-house field sales force, weigh two readings, and finally ask about the limits of transfer.

The documented facts: from 1945 to today

According to the company history, Adolf Würth founded a wholesale business for screws and nuts in Künzelsau in 1945. When he died at the age of 45, his son Reinhold Würth, then 19, took over management. Annual revenue at that time was the equivalent of around 80,000 euros. In 1962, Reinhold Würth founded Würth Nederland, the first foreign subsidiary, followed the same year by Switzerland and Austria. In 1987, with revenue of 700 million euros, the company set itself the goal of exceeding five billion euros by 2000, and achieved it. On January 1, 1994, Reinhold Würth withdrew from operational management and became chair of the advisory board.

For fiscal year 2025, the group reported preliminary revenue of around 20.7 billion euros, of which 8.0 billion in Germany and 12.7 billion abroad, and an operating result of 940 million euros. At year-end it employed 86,415 people, around 44,000 of them in sales.

More than half of the workforce therefore works in sales. That is unusual for a trading company and makes Würth a good example of sales driven by a field force.

The mental model: in-house field sales or independent reps?

Every manufacturer and distributor must decide who sells for them at the customer’s premises. Two paths are open: employed salespeople in an in-house field sales force, or independent sales representatives who work on commission and often represent several manufacturers. The economist Erin Anderson (1985) examined this decision using transaction cost analysis, which goes back to Oliver Williamson. Its core idea: a company performs a task itself rather than buying it on the market when the costs of steering and control on the market become too high.

Anderson analyzed data from 13 electronic component manufacturers in 159 U.S. sales districts. The main finding: the harder it was to measure a salesperson’s performance, the more likely companies were to rely on employed salespeople, because they could then use management and observation rather than commission alone as a means of control. In-house sales forces were also associated with complex, hard-to-learn product lines and with districts where many tasks besides selling arose. She found no relationship with company size, travel requirements, or the importance of key accounts.

Anderson also describes the counterarguments fairly. Reps bring existing customer relationships, cause hardly any fixed costs, bundle product lines from several manufacturers, and often stay in the same territory for years. Employed salespeople, by contrast, are more willing to take on tasks without an immediate commission, such as introducing new products, staffing trade shows, or informing customers.

What the model explains about Würth

Würth is not a case from Anderson’s study, and the transfer is my assessment. But the features of the business fit remarkably well with the conditions under which, according to the model, an in-house field sales force makes sense.

• Large product range: A wholesaler of assembly and fastening materials carries a very large number of items. A salesperson who knows them and recommends the right solution to the customer needs long training. That speaks for employees, in whose training the investment pays off.
• Recurring demand in small quantities: Trade and industrial businesses use screws, wall plugs, and chemicals continuously. The value lies less in the individual order than in regular resupply. This makes the success of a single visit hard to measure, exactly the condition Anderson names as the strongest reason for employed salespeople.
• Tasks besides selling: Advice on applications, information about new products, and maintaining the customer relationship are hard to steer with commission alone.

The model thus explains why an in-house field sales force can make sense for this kind of business. It does not explain why Würth grew so strongly. That requires further factors about which less is publicly known, such as leadership, organization, early internationalization from 1962, and the consistency with which goals such as “Vision 2000” were pursued. Whether field sales was a cause or a consequence of growth cannot be derived from the public figures.

A field sales force is an advantage when the customer experiences the visit as help, not as an interruption.

Two readings: recipe for success or expensive habit?

Both readings carry weight. The first is supported by Würth’s development, even though it provides no proof of cause. The second describes real risks, because a large sales organization is a block of fixed costs. According to press reports, the group’s headcount fell from 88,393 at the end of 2024 to 86,415 at the end of 2025 while revenue rose by 2.3 percent. Which areas were affected is not broken down. But it shows that growth does not automatically mean more staff, even for such a company.

I therefore consider a combining reading the more sound one: field sales is not a recipe for success in itself, but a tool that fits a particular business. Where product range, recurring demand, and advice come together, it can be a lasting advantage. Where customers buy standard goods without advice, it quickly becomes an expensive habit.

What small businesses can transfer

A business with ten or fifty employees will not build a field sales force with thousands of salespeople. But principles derived from the case and the model can be transferred.

1. Know the customer’s demand

   Check whether your customers have recurring demand. If so, regular presence is worth more than individual campaigns.

2. Choose the sales channel deliberately

   Ask with Anderson’s criteria: is a salesperson’s performance easy to measure? Is the product line hard to learn? Are there many tasks besides selling? The more often the answer is yes, the more an employed salesperson pays off compared with a rep.

3. Set territories and rhythm

   Every customer has a fixed contact person and a visit or contact rhythm that fits their value.

4. Link every visit to a benefit

   A visit without a reason costs both sides time. A visit with information, a stock check, or a solution to a problem strengthens the relationship.

5. Check the economics

   Roughly calculate what a visit costs and what contribution margin it brings on average. A field sales force that does not pay off is not an advantage.

When the first employed salesperson makes sense and which expectations are realistic is described in the guide hiring your first salesperson. How sales grows from the owner to an independent team is shown in the four phases of sales growth. And if you want to work with other businesses instead of your own salespeople, you will find guidance in setting up sales partnerships.

Limits of transfer

Three caveats belong to every lesson from this case. First, Würth is an exceptional case. Inferring a recipe from one successful company risks overlooking the many businesses that did not grow with a similar approach. Second, Anderson’s data come from the U.S. electronics industry of the early 1980s. The logic of the model is general, but the weights may have shifted with digital ordering channels. Third, public information about Würth is limited. How productive field sales is in detail is not known.

How salespeople are paid also influences whether a field sales force takes on long-term tasks. Anderson describes how pure commission mainly rewards the short-term deal. Which mix of fixed salary, commission, and bonus fits which sales organization is compared in sales compensation. How an owner leads a small sales team with goals and fixed meetings is described in the guide leading a sales team.

Conclusion: what the Würth case teaches

To the guiding question: Würth grew from a small screw wholesaler into a group with around 20.7 billion euros in revenue, and more than half of its employees work in sales. Anderson’s model (1985) makes it plausible why an in-house field sales force fits this business: a large product range, recurring demand, and many tasks besides selling. It does not explain the growth on its own; factors not fully documented in public, such as leadership and early internationalization, are likely to have contributed.

1. Use Anderson’s criteria to check whether your business speaks more for employed salespeople or for partners.
2. Assign your existing customers a fixed contact rhythm that fits their value.
3. Test the rhythm for three months with twenty customers and measure the effect.
4. Roughly calculate costs and contribution margin per visit before you hire staff.

For small businesses, the lesson is not to hire as many salespeople as possible. It is that regular, useful closeness to the customer can be a competitive advantage if the business fits and every visit pays off.